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EXCHANGE RATE ALIGNMENT: DOMESTIC 
AND INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES 
. . . if nations can learn to provide themselves with full employment 
by their policy . . . there need be no important economic forces calcu-
lated to set the interest of one country against that of its neighbours. 
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The regulation of international monetary affairs by international 
organizations is currently in a transitional stage. International monetary 
regulation, like most other forms of international regulation, is depen-
dent primarily on cooperation and conciliation rather than enforcement 
of binding rules. The solution to international monetary problems thus 
lies in the development of "codes of conduct" necessary for governing 
nationalistic behavior in a multinational, interdependent world. 1 
The principal international monetary institution, the International 
Monetary Fund, was established after World War II during a period 
when prospects for cooperation among the major nations were high. 2 The 
major objectives of the International Monetary Fund (the Fund) were 
to promote "international monetary co-operation"3 and "exchange sta-
bility"4 and to "assist in the establishment of a multi-lateral system of 
payments."5 The attainment of these objectives by the Fund is consid-
ered to be a means of helping its 126 members achieve economic growth, 
high levels of employment, and improved standards of living.6 
The Board of Governors of the Fund7 at its 1971 Annual Meeting 
requested the Executive Directors to study all aspects of the interna-
1. See Statement by the Honorable Paul A . Volcker, Under Secretary of the Treasury 
for Monetary Affairs before the Subcommittee on International Economics of the Joint 
Economic Committee, June 26, 1973, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY NEWS No. S-244. See 
generally Russell, Transgovernmental Interaction in the International Monetary System, 
1960-1972, INT'L ORGANIZATION, Autumn, 1973, at 431. 
2. The International Monetary Fund was created by a multilateral agreement. Arti-
cles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401 (1945) , 
T.I.A.S . No. 1501, 2 U.N .T.S. 39, as amended effective July 28, 1969, 20 INT'L FINANCIAL 
NEWS SURVEY 985 (1969) [hereinafter cited as IMF Agreement]. 
3. IMF Agreement, supra note 2, art . I, § 1. 
4. Id . art. I, § 3. 
5. Id . art. I, § 4. 
6. Id. art. I, § 2. 
7. The Board of Governors of the Fund, on which each mem her country is represented 
by a Governor and an Alternate, is the highest authority of the Fund. IMF Agreement, 
supra note 2, art. XII , § 2(a) . The Board may delegate many of its powers to the Executive 
Directors. Id. art. XII, § 2(b). Five of the twenty Executive Directors are elected by the 
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tional monetary system and report to the Governors on measures neces-
sary for the improvement or reform of the international system.8 The 
resulting report carried a resolution adopted by the Governors in July 
1972, establishing an ad hoc Committee of the Board of Governors on 
Reform of the International Monetary System and Related Issues. 9 This 
committee, known as the Committee of Twenty, met for the first time 
in 1972 and recently held its last meeting on June 13, 1974. The result 
of the final meeting was an outline of proposals for the reform of the 
international monetary system. 
This Comment will discuss the Outline of Reform 10 prepared by the 
Committee of Twenty at their final meeting in June 1974. A simplified 
model of international monetary relations will be presented in order to 
isolate the important problems which necessitate international agree-
ment. The next section of this Comment analyzes the problems of inter-
national monetary relations in light of the conflicting interests of coun-
tries having a balance of payments deficit and those having a surplus. 
Part III of this Comment describes the specific proposals of the Outline 
of Reform prepared by the Committee of Twenty and discusses their 
impact on the working of the present Articles of Agreement. It describes 
the exchange rate adjustment problem confronting the Fund, which is 
attempting to establish a mechanism most consistent with its interna-
tional economic goals. 11 Finally, in Part IV, the Comment discusses two 
impediments which are blocking overall reform of the monetary system: 
inflation and the build-up of foreign reserves by oil-exporting countries. 
II. NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE CHOICE OF ADJUSTMENT 
METHODS 
A. Simplified Model 
In order to illustrate the important role of international agreement 
in the adjustment of exchange rates, it will be useful to visualize inter-
national monetary relationships in the form of a simplified model. This 
simplified model parallels the international monetary system as it has 
five members with the largest quotas and the remaining fifteen are elected by groups of 
countries defined by the Articles of Agreement. Id. art. XII, § 3. 
8. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH 
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, 1971 (Resolution No. 26-9) 331-32; 23 INT'L 
FINANCIAL NEWS SURVEY (No. 39, 1971) at 322. 
9. See SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Resolution No. 27-
10) 151 (6th issue 1972). 
10. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND BY THE COMMITTEE ON REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONE-
TARY SYSTEM AND RELATED ISSUES (June 14, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Committee of 
Twenty Outline of Reform] (Reprints are available from the Office of Public Relations of 
the International Monetary Fund). 
11. See text accompanying notes 3-6 supra. 
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actually developed. In order to simplify the model, it will refer to only 
two countries, Country A and Country B. 
Country A, having found exchange of goods and services on a 
strictly barter system unwieldy for international as well as intra-
national trade, issued white tokei:is as a legally acceptable means of 
payment for all traded commodities. When these tokens were originally 
issued, they could be exchanged for a certain quantity of gold which the 
government of Country A owned and h~ld as a reserve fund. Although 
the tokens are no longer exchangeable for gold, 12 the people of Country 
A continue to recognize the tokens at a particular value specified by the 
government. 
Country B has established a similar mode of intra-national ex-
change through the use of black tokens. These black tokens represent a 
certain quantity of goods or services within Country B which may be 
obtained by surrendering one's black tokens. 
The use of tokens representing a certain amount of purchasing 
power becomes more complicated on an international level because any 
trade between the two countries creates a problem of international ex-
change. For example, when a citizen in Country A, who uses white 
tokens as his national currency, wishes to trade with a citizen of Country 
B, who uses black tokens, the question arises as to what value the tokens 
of one country have when they are transferred and held by another 
country's citizens. As a result, it is necessary that in each country there 
be a means of exchanging one type of token for the other through a 
valuation of one currency vis-a-vis the other. 
The most obvious means of assessing values in the exchange of one 
currency for another is to set the value of one currency vis-a-vis the other 
as the market price (i.e., the price at which the currencies would be 
traded by a willing seller and a willing buyer). However, this system, 
called the "freely floating" exchange rate system, appears to have major 
drawbacks.'3 The "freely floating" system allows continuous adjust-
ments of the price of a country's currency against the currencies of other 
countries. Because of this flexibility in exchange rates, the system does 
not necessarily require each country to alter its domestic economic poli-
12. The world's major countries abandoned the gold standard in the 1930's. P. 
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 683 (8th ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as SAMUELSON]. 
13. The Fund has defined a "floating" exchange rate as one which exists when a 
country's "currency is floating independently in the sense that it is not pegged, within 
relatively narrow margins, to any other currency or composite of currencies." International 
Monetary Fund, Press Release No. 74/30, at 4 (June 13, 1974). The drawbacks of "floating 
exchange rates" have repeatedly been pointed out by the Executive Directors of the Fund. 
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE ROLE OF EXCHANGE RATES IN THE ADJUST-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS 42, 67-78 (1970). See also R. WEISWEILLER, FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE 118 (1970). 
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cies when the country is facing a chronic deficit or surplus in its balance 
of payments. 14 
Because of the alleged disadvantages of "freely floating" exchange 
rates, Country A and Country B negotiated a fixed rate at which white 
tokens would be exchanged for black tokens. ts This "fixed" exchange 
rate system requires each country to maintain the market price of its 
currency at the "fixed" exchange rate. 16 
However, the system of "fixed" exchange rates also became unman-
ageable. As the underlying economic conditions in Country A and Coun-
try B changed, the long-run market price of their currencies also 
changed. 17 In other words, supply and demand for the currencies dic-
tated a long-run rate of exchange different from that set by the interna-
tional agreement between Country A and Country B. As a result, Coun-
try A, which faced a chronic deficit, was no longer able to maintain the 
value of white tokens vis-a-vis black tokens at the value "fixed" by 
agreement with Country B. Since "fixed" exchange rate obligations 
could no longer be honored, currencies were subsequently valued by a 
"freely floating" exchange rate system. ts Due to the disadvantages of the 
14. In our simplified model, the problem may be illustrated as follows: The white 
tokens received by citizens of Country B in return for goods shipped to Country A may 
be held by citizens of Country B rather than being immediately exchanged for black 
tokens in the currency exchange market. Thus if Country B has a balance of trade surplus 
(i.e. , Country B's commodity exporte exceed its imports), the tokens of Country A will 
accumulate in Country B. However, Country B, acting in its own interest, should not allow 
this situation to continue to exist because it will desire to have goods or its own currency 
rather than the currency of Country B, which is of questionable value in terms of the 
commodities of other countries. 
15. A system of "fixed" exchange rates was agreed to at the Bretton Woods Confer-
ence in 1944. IMF Agreement, supra note 2, art. IV. 
16. A country can support the market price of its currency vis-a-vis other currencies 
by intervening in exchange markets and purchasing its own currency with reserves of gold 
or foreign currency. In our simplified model, if Country B wanted to prevent the value of 
black tokens from falling relative to white tokens, it could intervene on the exchange 
market and buy up black tokens by exchanging some of its reserve stock of gold or by 
exchanging white tokens held in its reserves. This action would have the effect of raising 
the price of black tokens relative to white tokens. See SAMUELSON, supra note 12, at 687-
88. 
17. Several examples of underlying economic conditions which may cause a shift in 
the long-run market price of a country's currency are: productivity, unemployment, con-
sumer tastes, and foreign military spending. See SAMUELSON, supra note 12, at 697. 
Another fundamental cause for the breakdown of the "fixed" exchange rate system 
was the tolerance of the system for substantial and persistent deficits or surpluses without 
an adjustment in the underlying exchange rate balance. R. WEISWEILLER, FOREIGN 
EXCHANGE 100-05 (1972). 
18. The recent history of deviations from the Bretton Woods system of "fixed" ex-
change rates is as follows: On February 15, 1971, the United States suspended the convert-
ibility of the dollar for gold reserve assets and, on August 17, 1971, took other actions to 
alleviate its chronic deficit. Proclamation No. 4074, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,724. (The actions were 
taken by President Nixon under the authority granted to him by the Trading with the 
Enemy Act of 1971, 40 Stat. 411 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C . App. § 5(b) (1964) .) 
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"freely floating" system, discussed above, the countries are seeking to 
form a new agreement to stabilize the rate at which one currency will 
be exchanged for the other. 
B. Confiicting Viewpoints of Deficit and Surplus Countries 
The difficulties encountered in forming an international agreement 
in such a situation may be exacerbated by an apparent difference of 
interests between those countries experiencing a balance of payments 
deficit and those countries experiencing a surplus. This divergence is 
particularly apparent when attempts are made to establish duties to be 
carried out by both deficit and surplus countries. 
1. DEFICIT COUNTRIES 
A deficit in a country's balance of payments will occur when its 
imports (expenditures) exceed its exports (receipts). A country which 
has experienced a chronic deficit is under constant pressure from credi-
tors in other nations to pay for its trade deficit by transfering funds from 
its stock of monetary reserves. 20 But there are absolute limitations on the 
ability of a deficit country to finance a trade deficit by such transfers of 
foreign exchange. A continuing balance of payments deficit may be 
financed only to the extent of the foreign reserves21 held by the deficit 
country. Such an absolute restraint may place severe short-run pressure 
on a deficit country which has depleted its stock of foreign reserves. 
Since deficit countries face such serious economic constraints, they 
will be cautious in international negotiations not to agree to obligations 
which will worsen a chronic deficit position. For example, a country 
Following these actions by the United States, all monetary authorities allowed their cur-
rencies to float without the consultation steps and approval required by Article VIII, 
Section 6 of the IMF Agreement. However, on December 18, 1971, the major industrial 
countries reached an agreement, known as the "Smithsonian Agreement," which estab-
lished a new exchange rate structure. The "Smithsonian Agreement" was followed until 
February 1973, when an exchange crisis broke the re-established "fixed" rates. On March 
12, 1973, the Committee of Ten decided to cease transactions supporting the "fixed" rates 
of the "Smithsonian Agreement." Rueff, Refiections on Currency and Credit, 6 INT'L 
CURRENCY REV., March-April, 1974, at 9. 
19. See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra. 
20. The pressure to make transfers from reserves will not be present under a system 
of "freely floating" exchange rates because alignment may be achieved by making contin-
uous price adjustments. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text. 
21. A country's foreign reserves consist of its holdings of gold, special drawing rights 
(see note 48 infra), reserve positions in the Fund, and holdings of foreign exchange. Foreign 
exchange may be defined as "holdings . . . of claims on foreigners in the form of bank 
deposits, Treasury bills, short and long-term government securities, and other claims 
usable in the event of a balance of payments deficit . . . . " 27 INT'L FINANCIAL STATISTICS 
17 (No. 7, July, 1974). 
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experiencing a chronic deficit should realize that in the long-term it is 
in its best interest to devaluate its currency. 22 Otherwise it will face 
severe contractionary pressures on incomes and employment. Thus, the 
deficit country should argue for a system which imposes a responsibility 
on all countries, deficit and surplus alike, to take appropriate action to 
adjust exchange rates before recessionary effects become intolerable for 
deficit countries.23 
2. SURPLUS COUNTRIES 
A surplus in a country's balance of payments will occur when its 
exports (receipts) exceed its imports (expenditures). This surplus will 
cause, in the long-run, a build-up in the foreign reserves of the surplus 
countries. 24 There is no necessary limit to the extent which the build-
up of reserves by the surplus countries may continue. Thus the surplus 
country does not experience the same pressure to adjust exchange rates 
as does a deficit country whose reserves are nearing exhaustion.25 
Because of the absence of this pressure on surplus countries, finan-
cial representatives in surplus countries are wont to take the position 
22. See F. MACHLUP, THE ALIGNMENT OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES 22 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as MACHLUP]. However, the long-term interest of the country will not 
necessarily control the arguments of various interest groups within the economy. Import-
ers and their immediate consumers may resist devaluation because the immediate effect 
will be a relative increase in the price of imports. Cf. Gerakis, Budgetary Implications of 
a Devaluation, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, March, 1973, at 7. 
23. MACHLUP, supra note 22, at 21-22. 
Economic conditions in two of the world's major deficit countries are as follows: 
The United Kingdom experienced a current account deficit of 243 million pounds in 
the fourth quarter of 1973. BANKERS TRUST EUROPE, BUSINESS OUTLOOK: UNITED KINGDOM, 
May 6, 1974. The rise in oil prices, a causative factor of this deficit, will ultimately add 
another 1 1/2 billion pounds a year to the U.K. trade deficit if there is not a drop in oil 
prices before the end of 1974. THE ECONOMIST, March 2, 1974, at 69. An exacerbating factor 
has been the dilatory response of the government to the need for currency devaluation. 
THE ECONOMIST, June 15, 1974, at 11. 
Italy, the most severe example of a deficit country, experienced a 490 billion lire 
deficit in January 1974. BANKERS TRUST EUROPE, BUSINESS OUTLOOK: ITALY, May 6, 1974. 
"Although Italy's problems are by no means confined to its balance of payments difficul-
ties, it is accepted that to do nothing to alleviate them could spell disaster to Italian 
democracy." THE ECONOMIST, June 15, 1974, at 107. Italy, responding to conditions placed 
on its $1.2 billion borrowing from the Fund in June 1974, has imposed an emergency 
budget designed to cut demand by increasing taxes 2 billion lire a year and limiting credit 
to 14.5 billion lire. THE ECONOMIST, June 29, 1974, at 111. 
24. MACHLUP, supra note 22, at 19-21. See also H. HELLER, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
ECONOMICS 206 (1974). 
Germany, the major surplus country in Western Europe, had an 11.5 billion dollar 
surplus for the first seven months of 1974. THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 31, 1974, at 65. 
25. "A continuing payments surplus can be financed indefinitely through endless 
accumulation of foreign assets and endless creation of domestic money issued in payment 
for the foreign currency acquired." MACHLUP, supra note 22, at 22. 
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that "it is unfair to ask their countries to bear the 'burden' of adjust-
ment, since their surpluses are caused by the mistake of others and not 
by their own."26 This position reflects a reliance on the mercantilist view 
of foreign exchange which maintains that the foreign trade objective of 
a country is to accumulate as much gold as possible by sustaining a 
surplus balance of trade. 27 However, the mercantilist theory of foreign 
exchange lost efficacy with the abandonment of the gold standard be-
cause, after that event, the size of a country's gold stock did not neces-
sarily reflect its economic strength. 28 
The proper view of the interests of surplus countries reveals that the 
continued build-up of foreign reserves by a surplus country causes infla-
tionary pressures. 29 These inflationary pressures, in turn, require "pro-
gressively more stringent fiscal and monetary policies to assure the 
steady contraction in domestic expenditures than would be required if 
the exchange rate remained unchanged."30 Thus a country with a 
chronic surplus could not only improve the financial situation of deficit 
nations by revaluing its exchange rate, 31 but could also ameliorate its 
own financial situation by reducing inflation and allowing free growth 
in domestic expenditures. 
III. RECENT EFFORTS TO REFORM EXCHANGE RATE 
ADJUSTMENT OBLIGATIONS 
The coordination of exchange rate policies conducted by individual 
countries necessitates a mechanism of international coordination to en-
sure that the several policies are mutually compatible. One of the pur-
poses of the International Monetary Fund is to "further the adjustment 
of international payments without resorting to measures destructive of 
national or international prosperity."32 Given this purpose, the impor-
tant question with respect to exchange rate policy is: what set of interna-
tional rules should the Fund adopt so as to optimize the likelihood of 
achieving its objective? 
26. R. HINSHAW, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT 6 (1971) [hereinafter 
cited as HINSHAW]. 
27. See MACHLUP, supra note 22, at 56-7. See also SAMUELSON, supra note 12, at 625. 
28. See FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK, MONTHLY ECONOMIC LETTER 9 (Aug. 1974). See 
also HINSHAW, supra note 26, at 143-44. 
29. See R. WEISWEILLER, FOREIGN EXCHANGE 106-07 (1972). 
30. See HINSHAW, supra note 26, at 6. When a surplus country continues to build up 
foreign reserves, the country is not realizing, in the form of either profits or wages, the 
productive advantage which it has over other countries. Rather, the advantage is diverted 
into the accumulation of barren stocks of gold and foreign currency. Cf. note 14 supra. 
31. When the price of a currency goes up relative to gold, it is said that the currency 
has been revalued. When a currency officially goes down in price relative to gold, it is said 
that the currency has been devalued. 
32. IMF Agreement, supra note 2, art. I, § 5. 
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The Committee of Twenty, during the course of its negotiations, 
dealt with three aspects of the exchange rate adjustment problem which 
it felt that the present Articles of Agreement of the Fund do not ade-
quately deal with. 33 First, the Committee made certain alterations in the 
par value system in order to increase the possibility that member na-
tions would find it financially possible to comply with their par value 
obligations.34 Second, the Committee of Twenty agreed upon a new role 
for "freely floating" exchange rates within the overall international 
monetary system.35 And finally, the Committee discussed the need for 
new and more specific pressures which might be applied to a country 
which did not take appropriate action to comply with its obligations 
under the Fund's Articles of Agreement. 36 
A. Altered Scheme of Par Values 
The Articles of Agreement of the Fund provide for the establish-
ment of a "par value" for the currency of each member country to be 
expressed in terms of gold or the United States dollar of fixed gold 
weight. 37 Each member country has agreed to maintain spot exchange 
rates within a range of fluctuation above or below the par value. 38 The 
size of the range of fluctuation presently equals one percent of the par 
value. 39 The purpose of the par value obligation is to provide a stable 
pattern of exchange rates and to prevent members from manipulating 
33. The Committee of Twenty also discussed several issues other than those relating 
to exchange rate adjustment. The most important of these were: 
a. The convertibility, consolidation, and management of capital flows. 
b. The composition of primary reserve assets. 
c. Credit facilities in favor of developing countries. 
Committee of Twenty Outline of Reform, supra note 10, at 6-10. 
34. See § IIl(A) infra. 
35. See § IIl(B) infra. 
36. See § IIl(C) infra. 
37. IMF Agreement, supra note 2, art. IV, § l(a). 
38. The exact obligation in the Articles of Agreement reads: 
The maximum and minimum rates for exchange transactions between the cur-
rencies of members taking place within their territory shall not differ from parity 
(i) in the case of spot exchange transactions by more than one percent; and 
(ii) in the case of other eJechange transactions by a margin which exceeds the 
margin for spot exchange transactions by more than the Fund considers reason-
able. 
IMF Agreement, supra note 2, art. IV, § 3. 
39. The Executive Directors of the Fund, on December 18, 1971, adopted a "tempo-
rary regime" of wider margins. Executive Directors Decision No. 3463-(71/126), reprinted 
in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
FUND 12-15 (1970). The Directors decided that they would, with certain restrictions, con-
sider a country to be in compliance with Article 4(a) of the IMF Agreement even if it 
allowed its exchange rate to fluctuate as much as 2.25 percent on either side of parity. Id. 
paras. 1, 5, at 12, 14. 
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exchange rates for their own competitive purposes. 
The Outline of Reform agreed upon by the Committee of Twenty 
reaffirms the Fund's belief in the need for a system of exchange rate par 
values. Paragraph Eleven of the Outline states that "the exchange rate 
mechanism will be based on stable but adjustable par values." 40 The 
Committee, by using the term "stable but adjustable" meant to imply 
that par value alterations are not to be considered an extraordinary 
circumstance. 41 Rather, "countries should, whether in surplus or deficit, 
make appropriate par value changes promptly."42 The Outline suggests, 
furthermore, that the Fund adopt simplified procedures for approving 
small par value changes. 43 The implicit intent of these sections of the 
Outline of Reform is that par values be re-established, but that national 
financial conditions and policies should be more determinative than in 
the past of whether or not a par value change will be allowed. 
A further alteration of the par value system proposed by the Outline 
of Reform, but as yet unagreed upon, is the widening of the range of 
values around parity within which the exchange rate may legally fluc-
tuate. One value mentioned in the unagreed-upon appendix to the Out-
line of Reform is 2114 percent of parity. 44 Significantly, the Outline of 
Reform points out that "the maximum margins ... would need to be 
decided in the light of conditions prevailing at that time." 45 This phrase 
recognizes the fact that the margin of fluctuation is intended to allow 
for fluctuations in the spot exchange rate which are due to short-term 
forces and not due to long-term forces which require a change in the 
underlying par value itself. For this reason, the margin of fluctuation 
should ideally respond to the size of expected short-term pressures on 
the spot exchange rate. 
A third alteration in the par value system proposed by the Outline 
of Reform is that "it would be desirable that the system of exchange 
margins and intervention should be more symmetrical than that which 
existed in practice under the Bretton Woods system."46 This goal refers 
to the problem of the dichotomy of interests between those nations 
facing a balance of payments surplus and those facing a deficit.47 The 
40. Committee of Twenty Outline of Reform, supra note 10, para. 11 (emphasis 
added). 
41. C. Morse, Speech to the International Monetary Conference, Williamsburg, June 
7, 1974, at 3. (On file at the office of the Syracuse Journal of International Law and 
Commerce.) 
42. Committee of Twenty Outline of Reform, supra note 10, para. 11. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. Annex 3, at 3-1. Note that the 2.25% margin of fluctuation was also used in 
the temporary par value regime established by the Smithsonian Agreement. See notes 18 
and 39 supra. 
45. Committee of Twenty Outline of Reform, supra note 10, Annex 3, at 3-1. 
46. Id. para. 12. 
47 . See § ll(B) supra. 
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Outline of Reform does not specify how the obligations under the Fund 
might be made more symmetrical. However, there appear to be two 
methods for satisfying such an objective. One is to require a country to 
intervene in the exchange markets of several different currencies with 
respect to its own currency. This requirement would avoid the situation 
where a surplus country was not required to make purchases because the 
country issuing its intervention currency was in deficit. Another method 
for increasing the symmetry of the par value system would be to require 
a country to intervene to support the exchange rate of its currency by 
buying or selling SDR's. 48 This method makes it even more certain that 
a surplus country could not avoid its obligation to keep its currency 
aligned, for a surplus country would be required to sell SDR's which 
could be purchased by any country running a chronic deficit. 
The three alterations in the par value system which have been 
proposed by the Outline of Reform and mentioned above would not 
accomplish the comprehensive reform of the international monetary 
system which was set as the goal of the Committee of Twenty. The 
Committee, in its attempt to provide a system flexible enough to be 
capable of implementation, has included in its Outline of Reform obli-
gations which lack sufficient clarity to provide the predictability which 
the reformed system was intended to have. One example of the open-
ended obligations in the Outline of Reform is that which forbids coun-
tries from making "inappropriate par value changes. " 49 In order to de-
termine what the Fund might deem to be "inappropriate," the only 
guidance given to a member country is the adjoining phrase of the 
Outline which declares that "the exchange rate mechanism will remain 
based on stable but adjustable par values."50 Another example of the 
flexibility of the altered par value obligation is the exception to the par 
value obligations which is made by the provisions for "freely floating" 
exchange rates, which will be-discussed in the next section. 
Although the proposals of the Committee of Twenty for altering the 
par value system do not accomplish their goal of overall reform, they do 
serve as an important step in the envisioned evolution of the interna-
tional monetary system. This step is the reinstitution of par values into 
a world economy which has made it impossible for the old obligations 
to be followed by member countries. The changes which will be made 
by the Outline of Reform will make it more feasible for a country to 
48. SDR's (special drawing rights) are a numeraire for measuring the extent to which 
a member country may make withdrawals from the Fund's Special Drawing Account. 
SDR's came into _existence on July 28, 1969 with the amendments to the IMF Agreement 
which now constitute articles 21-27. See 20 INT'L FINANCIAL NEWS SURVEY 985 (1969); W. 
HABERMEIER, OPERATIONS AND TRANSACTIONS IN SDR's, IMF Pamphlet Series No. 17 (1973). 
49. Committee of Twenty Outline of Reform, supra note 10, para. 11. 
50. Id. 
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comply with their par value obligations without unduly straining its 
financial resources and prejudicing its domestic economic objectives. 
The agreement to widen the margins of fluctuation is a prime example 
of the effort of the Committee to make the par value system viable 
under the present uncertain economic conditions. 
B. Provision for Floating Exchange Rates 
Presently the Fund cannot legally control whether or not a country 
has a floating exchange rate. The Fund can exercise surveillance over 
the manner in which members fulfill their undertaking under Article IV, 
Section 4(a), "to collaborate with the Fund to promote exchange stabil-
ity, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements with other members, 
and to avoid competitive exchange alterations."51 
The Committee of Twenty has proposed that since floating ex-
change rates are currently in widespread use, even by the major coun-
tries, 52 the Furid Articles of Agreement should deal specifically with this 
form of exchange rate adjustment by placing conditions and restrictions 
on their use. The Outline of Reform, recently adopted by the Commit-
tee, authorizes countries to adopt floating rates, subject to authoriza-
tion, surveillance and review by the Fund. 53 This limited authorization 
of floating exchange rates is an explicit recognition by the Committee 
of the floating exchange rate system which has recently been adopted 
by many member countries due to the financial conditions in those 
countries. 
The most important aspect of the reform proposals is the power 
given to the Fund to withdraw from a country its authority to float its 
currency. Paragraph Thirteen of the Outline of Reform states that: 
Authorization to float may be withdrawn if the country fails to conform 
with the guidelines for conduct, or if the Fund decides that continued 
authorization to float would be inconsistent with the international in-
terest.54 
As a result of this paragraph, the Fund would have a specific provision 
to apply in the event of the use of floating exchange rates and thus would 
not have to rely exclusively upon Article IV, Section 4(a), the section 
generally requiring members to collaborate with the Fund to promote 
exchange stability.55 
51. IMF Agreement, supra note 2, art. IV, § 4(a). 
52. On March 12, 1973, the Group of Ten agreed that they would no longer attempt 
to maintain the par values of their currencies, as required by Article IV of the IMF 
Agreement. See note 18 supra. 
53. Committee of Twenty Outline of Reform, supra note 10, para. 13. 
54. Id. 
55. See note 51 supra and accompanying text. 
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Now that the Committee of Twenty has recommended a qualified 
recognition of floating exchange rates, an important element of the re-
form may prove to be the Guidelines for Floating Exchange Rates, re-
cently adopted by the Executive Directors of the Fund.56 According to 
the Guidelines, members of the Fund having floating exchange rates 
would be under several obligations. In the short-run, a member with a 
floating exchange rate would be under an obligation to "intervene on the 
foreign exchange market as necessary to prevent or moderate sharp and 
disruptive fluctuations ... in the exchange value of its currency."57 
Furthermore, if the country's exchange rate "moved outside of what the 
Fund considered to be a range of reasonable estimates of the medium-
term norm for the exchange rate, " 58 the Fund could consult with the 
member and encourage it to take actions not inconsistent with allowing 
the exchange rate to move to its medium-term norm. 
The action which the Committee of Twenty has taken with respect 
to floating exchange rates is appropriate in light of the current wide-
spread use of floating exchange rates. It might be argued that the Com-
mittee has done nothing more than legislate reality (i.e., form rules 
which .merely reflect the status quo). However, a preferable view of the 
Outline of Reform reveals that the qualifications which the Guidelines 
have placed on the use of floating exchange rates are a needed force in 
the effort to stabilize the current widespread use of floating exchange 
rates, only some of which use can be justified by current economic 
conditions. 
C. Pressures 
One of the most important issues left unresolved by the Committee 
of Twenty at its final meeting was the form of pressures to be applied 
to a country which does not act in accordance with its obligations under 
the revised international monetary system. The Committee generally 
agreed that provision should be made for graduated pressures to be 
available to the Fund for application to both surplus and deficit coun-
tries in cases of large and persistent imbalances.59 However, the Com-
mittee did not agree on what forms or methods of activation the pres-
sures should have. 
One of the underlying reasons for the failure of the Committee to 
reach agreement on the forms and activation of pressures was the di-
chotomy of interests between deficit and surplus countries. Countries 
experiencing a chronic surplus often do not feel that it is in their best 
56. International Monetary Fund, Press Release No. 74/30 (June 13, 1974) . 
57. Committee of Twenty Outline of Reform, supra note 10, Annex 4, at 4-2. 
58. Id. at 4-3 . 
59. Committee of Twenty Outline of Reform, supra note 10, para. 10. 
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interest to agree to stringent obligations to adjust their exchange rates; 
especially obligations which contain sanctions effective against surplus 
countries. 60 
Although the Committee failed to agree upon appropriate pres-
sures, it did discuss, in an appendix to the Outline of Reform, several 
possible forms of pressures. 61 The first possible scheme of pressure would 
combine a charge on reserve accumulation above a certain norm62 with 
a requirement to deposit reserves above a specified level with an Excess 
Reserves Account. 63 This scheme of pressures would most likely be 
strongly opposed by those countries which have chronically run a bal-
ance of payments surplus and are likely to acquire excess reserves 
thereby bringing them within the purview of the pressures. A second 
possible form of pressure which could be applied to a country which 
failed to meet its adjustment obligations would be to withhold for a 
specified or indefinite period all or part of future SDR allocations64 of a 
country in surplus. A third form of pressure would be to publish a report 
on the external position and policies of a country in surplus.65 Finally, 
the most severe form of pressure would be for the Fund to authorize 
other countries to apply discriminatory trade restrictions66 against the 
surplus country.67 
The Committee of Twenty did not agree on the form which pres-
sures should take nor did they agree on the process by which pressures 
would be activated. The mechanisms which the Committee considered 
but did not agree upon fall into three general categories: discretionary, 
presumptive, and automatic. 68 A discretionary mechanism contem-
60. Surplus countries often take the position that a revaluation of their currency 
would cause a reduction in their exports. Although this is likely to be true, the conclusion 
does not necessarily follow that it is against the overall interest of surplus countries to be 
required to revalue their currency when a serious imbalance exists. The benefits from 
reduced inflationary pressures which are likely to result from a reduced trade surplus may 
more than outweigh the detriment suffered from reduced exports. See MACHLUP, supra 
note 22, at 55-58. Cf. notes 14 and 16 supra. 
61. Committee of Twenty Outline of Reform, supra note 10, Annex 2. 
62. Id. Annex 2, § A(i), at 2-1. 
63. Id. Annex 2, § A(ii), at 2-1. 
64 . Id. Annex 2, § A(iii), at 2-1. 
65. Id. Annex 2, § A(iv), at 2-1. 
66. Discriminatory trade measures which might be used to sanction a non-complying 
member include tariffs, embargoes, etc. However, the use of such measures is also con-
trolled by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI). Thus modifications in 
GATI might be necessary before the pressures allowed by the IMF Articles of Agreement 
could be applied by members of the Fund who were also signatories of GATT. See GoLD, 
THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 23 (1965) 
for a discussion of the Fund's relationship to the contracting parties of GATI. 
67. Committee of Twenty Outline of Reform, supra note 10, Annex 2, § A(v), at 2-1. 
68. Committee of Twenty Outline of Reform, supra note 10, at 2-2-2-3. 
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plates a grant of authority to the Executive Council of the Fund to assess 
a member country's actions and impose pressures if those actions do not 
comply with the obligations and principles of the Fund Articles of 
Agreement. 69 A presumptive mechanism is one in which precise and 
detailed rules for the imposition of pressures would apply but with a 
provision for overriding the rules in certain cases by means of the vote 
of an appropriate majority of the members. 70 An automatic mechanism 
is one in which precise rules necessarily determine when pressures will 
be activated against member countries.71 
One of the principal difficulties with implementing a system of 
pressures is that, due to the absence of operational experience, it is 
difficult to judge how any particular arrangement involving the use of 
specific pressures would work in practice. Until recently, this difficulty 
alone would have been enough to prevent the implementation of such a 
mechanism. However, the very fact of instability may serve as an impe-
tus for member countries to agree upon some forms of pressures, for all 
countries suffer a loss of trade when exchange rates become unpredicta-
ble. The implementation of pressures to comply with foreign exchange 
obligations (e.g., those relating to the level of a member country's re-
serves), earlier thought to be politically infeasible, may become feasible 
in an economic climate where all countries have something to gain from 
increased stability of exchange rates. 
IV. DETERRENTS FROM OVERALL REFORM 
Although the Committee of Twenty has made several proposals to 
reduce the present uncertainty wrought by the use of freely floating 
exchange rates, it did not achieve the overall reform which was its objec-
tive when it began its discussions over two years ago. Several reasons 
have been given, both by representatives of the Fund and by commenta-
tors observing their progress, to explain why only limited reform propos-
als were achieved. One of the two foremost reasons given is the rampant 
inflation which has caused uncertainty about the short-term future of 
international monetary conditions. A second, related reason is the sud-
den growth of reserves by the oil-exporting countries following price rises 
69. Morse, supra note 41, at 6. 
70. Id. at 5. An example of the use of a presumptive mechanism by the present 
Articles of Agreement is the grant of power to the Executive Directors of the Fund to 
prevent the "automatic" application of the remedy of ineligibility of a member for making 
an unauthorized change of par values. IMF Agreement, supra note 2, art. IV, § 6 and art. 
xv,§ 2(b). 
71. Morse, supra note 41, at 5. Canada, France, Germany and Japan all object very 
strongly to the adoption of an "automatic" mechanism for determining when or by what 
means exchange rates should be changed. See Geiger, The Issues in International Mone-
tary Reform, LOOKING AHEAD, Feb., 1973, at 7. 
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initiated by those countries. Both reasons will be discussed in this sec-
tion in an attempt to explain the current difficulties experienced by 
reform efforts and to evaluate more fully the actual progress which has 
been made by such reform efforts. 
A. lnfiation 
The par value system of exchange rates "depends on a reasonable 
degree of confidence, on the part of governments as well as the market, 
that rates will remain reasonably stable over a reasonable period."72 The 
par values of the currencies of member nations are supposed to reflect 
long-term or at least medium-term trends in market exchange rates. 
However, when a high rate of inflation exists it is difficult to make 
appropriate par value adjustments because long-term exchange rates 
are highly unpredictable. 
A United States Treasury spokesman, referring to the domestic 
economy, has stated that "in a world of accelerating inflation, financial 
stability can only be a dream."73 A similar statement could be made 
about the international economy during a period of inflation because the 
financial stability of the world's nations is a necessary precursor to 
stability in an international monetary system.74 
Although any international reform developed under conditions of 
widespread inflation is destined to be temporary and only partial in 
effect, this does not imply that immediate international cooperation is 
not necessary. Cooperation among countries is necessary in order to 
ensure that countries do not attempt to relieve these pressures through 
competitive devaluation or capital restrictions.75 
The de-stabilizing effect of inflation upon exchange rates is exacer-
bated by the fact that the rates of inflation experienced by individual 
countries are unequal. 76 Given differing rates of inflation, it would be 
inappropriate for the Fund to merely freeze exchange rates at their 
present levels. 77 The prevailing view among members of the Fund is that 
more continuous movements of exchange rates over time might help to 
modify some of the disturbances felt by countries who have a rate of 
72. Morse, supra note 41, at 2. 
73. Statement of Paul A. Volcker, Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary 
Affairs on February 27, 1974, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY NEWS No. S-368, at 12. 
74. See International Monetary Fund, IMF SURVEY, May 6, 1974, at 134. 
75. See Statement by the Honorable Paul A. Volcker, Under Secretary of the Treas-
ury for Monetary Affairs Before the Subcommittee on International Economics of the 
Joint Economic Committee, June 26, 1973, supra note 1 at 12. Morse, supra note 41, at 
12. 
76. See generally Seeking Antedates to a Global Plague, TIME, April 18, 1974, at 72-
76. 
77. See H. HELLER, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ECONOMICS 200-06 (1974). 
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inflation above or below the international average. 78 Reflecting this 
view, the Fund has provided that par value changes will be more readily 
available79 and that floating exchange rates may be adopted under cer-
tain circumstances. Ro Although these provisions for more continuous 
movements of exchange rates may alleviate the short-term balance of 
payments pressures on those countries hardest hit by inflation, it is not 
the type of action which is likely to ensure longer-range stability in 
exchange rates. 
The newly-proposed plan for more flexible exchange rates has no 
necessary restraining effect on the overall level of world inflation. In-
deed, such flexibility has the potential disadvantage of allowing a coun-
try to continue lax domestic policies of dealing with inflation.81 Longer-
range stability may be achieved only if there are pressures upon individ-
ual countries to adopt policies which will restrain domestic inflation. 
A fair assessment of the Outline of Reform requires some considera-
tion of the alternatives which the Committee of Twenty had in forming 
a system that would be both feasible and politically acceptable and 
would deal effectively with world inflation. One alternative would be to 
condition flexibility of a country's exchange rates on the adoption of 
domestic policies appropriately dealing with domestic inflation. How-
ever, this method is not feasible because the appropriate domestic poli-
cies for dealing with inflation are not known with sufficient exactitude 
to make their adoption a condition precedent to the use of Fund provi-
sions.82 Most other alternatives, e.g., the use of pressures for failure to 
comply with "reserve indicators," presently do not meet the test of 
political acceptability. Thus the ironic conclusion follows that the insta-
bility caused by rapid inflation is impeding efforts to achieve long-term 
stabilizing reform of the international scheme of exchange rate adjust-
ment. 
B. Reserve Build-Up by Oil-Exporting Countries 
All countries which import oil have recently faced, in varying de-
grees, a sharply increased import bill for energy products.83 The concur-
78. Cf. International Monetary Fund, Press Release No. 74/30 (June 13, 1974). 
79. See § III(A) supra. 
80. See § III(B) supra. 
81. See text accompanying notes 13-14 supra. 
82. An example of the widespread disagreement over the proper domestic policies to 
be used to combat inflation is the disagreement between American and British financial 
advisers over the appropriateness of the tight money policy pursued by Chairman Burns 
of the Federal Reserve Board. Cf. An Expensive Gamble to Slow lnfiation, NEWSWEEK, 
June 15, 1974, at 76-78. 
83. See Statement by Paul A. Volcker Before a Joint Hearing of the Subcommittee 
on International Finance of the House Banking and Currency Committee and the Sub-
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rent transfer of purchasing power to oil-exporting countries has caused 
a marked shift in the pattern of world payments and a rapid build-up 
of foreign reserves by the oil-exporting countries. These occurrences 
have caused several serious problems for the establishment of a depend-
able mode of exchange rate alignment. 
The build-up of reserves by oil-exporting countries stands as a seri-
ous obstacle to the adoption of mandatory standards of action based on 
the level of a country's reserves. The oil-exporting countries "are at a 
stage where their current use of resources cannot reasonably be expected 
to equal their output."84 Thus, since the oil-exporting countries must 
necessarily be expected to continuously accumulate foreign reserves, 
these countries cannot be expected to accept any obligation to keep their 
foreign reserves below a specified maximum level. 
Methods other than "reserve indicators" for dealing with the bal-
ance of payments problems caused by the surpluses of the oil-exporting 
countries appear similarly infeasible. An attempt to reduce the sur-
pluses through sudden exchange rate alignments would be ineffective. 
Due to the suddeness of the build-up of the oil surpluses and their 
overwhelming size, 85 an exchange rate alignment alone could not be 
expected to cause a sufficiently large alteration in trade to counter-
balance the huge surpluses of the oil-exporting countries. Rather, at-
tempts by oil-importing countries to adjust their balance of payments 
deficits by depreciating their currency would merely shift the payments 
burden among themselves, with a net deficit still remaining on the oil-
importing countries collectively.86 
In addition to the problem of the build-up of reserves discussed 
above, there exists the problem of uncertainty about the pattern of 
reserve flows which will occur when the oil-exporting countries begin to 
choose investment outlets for their surpluses. There is uncertainty both 
about the type of investments these countries will make and about 
which countries those investments will be made in. 87 The question which 
this problem presents to the Fund is how can the Fund "ensure that the 
pattern of such flows helps rather than hinders the achievement of 
committee on International Economics of the Joint Economic Committee on November 
13, 1973, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY NEWS No. S-324, at 11. 
84. Kafka, The International Monetary System in Transition-Part II, 13 VA. J. INT'L 
L. 539, 543 (1973). 
85. Saudi Arabia, alone, has increased its international reserves from 1,930 million 
dollars in the first quarter of 1972 to 6,225 million dollars in May 1974. From March 1974 
to May 1974, Saudi Arabia's foreign reserves rose 1,362 million dollars. 27 INT'L FINANCIAL 
STATISTICS 310-11 (No. 7, July, 1974). 
86. IMF SURVEY, May 6, 1974, at 133. 
87. See Tugendhat, Oil-How to Avoid a Catastrophe?, THE BANKER, Feb. 1974, at 
101-03; IMF SURVEY, March 18, 1974, at 82. 
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monetary and economic stability."88 While this question remains unan-
swered, attempts to provide a dependable exchange rate adjustment 
scheme can only be partially successful. 
There are several possibilities for amelioration of the instability 
which has been fostered by the surpluses of the oil-exporting countries. 
The first possibility is a voluntary choice by the oil-exporting countries 
to abate price increases. Some of the oil countries already favor such 
action. 89 The voluntary abatement of oil price increases would have the 
effect of limiting the surpluses which the oil-exporting countries contin-
uously experience. Even greater stability would occur if the oil-
exporting nations were willing to put their decision to limit production 
in the form of a multilateral agreement. A second possible circumstance 
which would tend to slow down the accumulation of reserves by oil-
exporting countries is a reduction in the demand for petroleum prod-
ucts. Although such a reduction is not likely in the short-term, a long-
term reduction in demand is likely if the price remains at its current 
level vis-a-vis other commodities.90 A third possibility is for the oil-
importing countries to create alternate sources of oil supply. However, 
alternative supplies will not be significantly developed for several 
years. 91 A fourth possibility is for the oil-exporting countries to establish 
predictable patterns of medium and long-term investments in other 
countries. 92 Unless events, such as the four just mentioned, occur to 
abate the pace of foreign reserve build-up by oil-exporting countries, the 
build-up will continue to hinder efforts at overall international mone-
tary reform. 93 
88. International Monetary Fund, IMF SURVEY, May 6, 1974, at 134; see also Speech 
by H. Joannes Wittween at the Economic Club of Detroit, May 6, 1974, IMF Press 
Release . 
89. See Demaree, Arab Wealth, as Seen through Arab Eyes, FORTUNE, April, 1974, 
at 108-09; see also Tugendhat, Oil-How to Avoid a Catastrophe?, THE BANKER, Feb., 
1974, at 99. 
90. Cf. Lomax, Oil and International Debt, THE BANKER, April, 1973, at 326. 
91. Oil from the Alaskan North Slope will not become significant until 1977. THE 
ECONOMIST, July 6, 1974, at 99. Similarly, England's reserves in the North Seas will not 
begin to yield over 100 million tons a year until 1980. THE ECONOMIST, May 11, 1974. But 
see Rose, Our Vast, Hidden Oil Resources, FORTUNE, April, 1974, at 104. Mr. Rose argues 
that vast quantities of oil reserves have become profitable to extract since the rise in the 
price of oil. Id. at 105. 
92. See IMF SURVEY, March 18, 1974, at 82; Mabro and Monroe, Arab Wealth from 
Oil: Problems of its Investment, INT'L AFF., Jan., 1974, at 15; THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 1974, 
at 66-69. 
93. The Fund has adopted several short-term devices to lessen the immediate fiscal 
impact of increased oil prices. The most important such device is the "oil facility," which 
allows countries facing serious balance of payments difficulties to borrow from a special 
fund supported by oil-exporting countries. IMF Press Release No. 74/31, June 13, 1974. 
However, such devices are directed toward short-term amelioration and not long-term 
stabilization. Cf. THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 1974, at 84. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Outline of Reform recently completed by the Committee of 
Twenty falls short of the comprehensive "code of conduct" which is 
necessary to control nationalistic monetary behavior. 94 One important 
aspect of comprehensive reform which was not included in the Outline 
of Reform is the imposition of enforceable obligations on surplus coun-
tries to prevent them from taking actions, such as the allowance of 
chronic reserve build-up, which unnecessarily prejudice the financial 
condition of deficit countries. Another necessary element of reform 
which was omitted from the Committee of Twenty's Outline of Reform 
was an adequate provision for influencing the domestic policies of deficit 
countries. For, in the absence of "fixed" exchange rates, there is an 
absence of inherent pressure in the international monetary system to 
prevent a deficit country from repeatedly devaluing its currency to fi-
nance a consistent deficit in its balance of payments. 95 
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the Outline of Reform just 
mentioned, the Committee of Twenty has taken the first necessary step 
in re-asserting the Fund's role in the regulation of exchange adjustment. 
That step is the formalization of principles with which to deal with the 
existent "freely floating" exchange rates. These principles, although less 
desirable than predictable rules and obligations, do create an interim 
"code of conduct" to be followed by member nations. By taking this 
cautious, pragmatic step, the Committee of Twenty has attempted to 
re-establish a modicum of exchange stability within a world economy 
threatened by the dual problem of inflation and excessive accumula-
tions of reserves by oil-exporting countries. The Committee has pro-
posed obligations which would be both financially feasible for deficit 
countries and politically acceptable to the surplus countries. 
When short-term stability has been restored to the adjustment of 
exchange rates, member countries, both deficit and surplus, will be able 
to more accurately assess their long-term interests. Only when exchange 
rates are reasonably predictable will a member country be able to ade-
quately weigh the effects which an overall reform would have on their 
own national interests against the benefits to be derived from a well-
defined, dependable international system of exchange rate adjustment. 
Such an assessment will be necessary before countries will be willing to 
surrender to the Fund the substantial amount of monetary sovereignty 
which will be necessary for the Fund to achieve an overall reform of the 
international mechanism for exchange rate adjustment. 
Keith Leon Baker 
94. See text accompanying note 1 supra. 
95. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. 
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